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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Wally Kay Schultz appeals from the district court's order summarily
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, and from its order denying his
motion for reconsideration.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In 2006, Schultz pied guilty to possession of methamphetamine.
pp.118-124.)

(R.,

The district court imposed a fixed five-year sentence, to run

concurrently with a sentence in another case.

(Id.)

Schultz filed no direct

appeal. (See R., p.195.)
In 2011, the Idaho State Police conducted an administrative investigation
of several employees of the Idaho State Police Forensic Services. (R., pp.9-10;
Petitioner's Exhibit B. 1) The ensuing report alleged that Forensics Lab Manager
Skyler Anderson and others "maintained an ongoing unauthorized quantity of
controlled narcotics for display purposes, outside the practices of the Forensics
Quality Manual and without proper documentation tracking and auditing," as far
back as 2003.

(R., pp.9-10; Petitioner's Exhibit B.)

used for tours of the facility.

The display drugs were

(Petitioner's Exhibit B, "Notice of Contemplated

Disciplinary Action," p.2.) Anderson was the forensic scientist who examined,

1

The Idaho Supreme Court granted Schultz' motion to augment the record with
Petitioner's Exhibits A and B, which were both introduced into evidence in the
course of his post-conviction proceedings. (3/7/13 Order.)
1

and identified as methamphetamine, the substances associated with Schultz'
possession of controlled substances charge and conviction. (R., pp.56-57.) The
State Appellate Public Defender, who previously represented Schultz in other
cases, informed Schultz of the Idaho State Police's disclosure. (R., p.9.)
In August 2011, Schultz filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief,
asserting various claims based on the Idaho State Police disclosure. (R., pp.119.) The district court appointed counsel to represent Schultz on the petition.
(R., p.30.) Through appointed counsel, Schultz filed an amended post-conviction

petition, alleging that Anderson's failure to disclose his lab misconduct prior to
Schultz' guilty plea constituted a Brady2 violation, and that the state violated his
Sixth Amendment confrontation rights by preventing him from cross-examining
Anderson.

(R., pp.94-98.) Schultz also filed a "Motion for an Order Determining

That This Matter Proceed as a Class Action." (R., pp.158-160.)
The state moved for summary dismissal of Schultz' amended petition. (R.,
pp.161-165, 177-179.)

In support of the motion, the state submitted a sworn

affidavit of Idaho State Police Forensic Services Quality Manager Matthew
Garnette, who asserted that Anderson's lab misconduct involved no forensic
testing, and that the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors-Laboratory
Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LAB) was notified of the misconduct and was
satisfied with the actions taken by the Idaho State Police to resolve the issue.
(R., pp.181-183.)

2

Brady v. Maryland, 837 U.S. 83 (1963).

2

The district court summarily dismissed Schultz' petition, and denied his
motion for the matter to proceed as a Class Action. (R., pp.194-204.) The court
then denied Schultz' subsequent motion for reconsideration. (R., pp.217-224.)
Schultz timely appealed. (R., pp.225-227.)

3

ISSUE
Schultz states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Whether or not the District Court erred in dismissing Schultz'
Post Conviction Petition.

2.

Whether or not the District Court erred in denying Schultz'
Motion for Reconsideration.

(Appellant's brief, p.8.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Schultz failed to show that the district court erred in summarily
dismissing his post-conviction petition?

2.

Has Schultz failed to show that the district court manifestly abused its
discretion in denying his motion for reconsideration?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Schultz Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Summarily
Dismissing His Post-Conviction Petition

Introduction

A.

Schultz contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his
post-conviction petition. (See generally Appellant's brief.) Specifically, Schultz
contends that the district court erred by rejecting his Brady claim. (Id.) However,
Schultz' challenge fails because the state had no duty to disclose the potentially
impeaching lab misconduct evidence prior to Schultz' guilty plea.

In the

alternative, Schultz has failed to show that he was prejudiced by any such lack of
disclosure.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted.
Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The
court freely reviews the district court's application of the law.

kl at 434, 835

P.2d

at 669.

C.

Schultz Failed To Establish a Bradv Violation
Idaho Code§ 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for

post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own

5

initiative.

"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must

present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to
summary dismissal "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of
material fact" as to each element of the petitioner's claims. Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007) (citing l.C. § 19-4906(b), (c));
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.
While a court must accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the
court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations,
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho
797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)). The trial court is not required to conduct an
evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition when the alleged facts, even if
true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief.

kl

(citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho

865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)). "Allegations contained in the application
are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the
record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law."

kl
Due process requires the prosecution to disclose to the defense all
exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession.

Brady v.

Maryland, 837 U.S. 83 (1963). When there has been a conviction after trial, a
6

Brady violation is found if the defendant can show: (1) that the evidence was
exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that the evidence was suppressed by the state;
and (3) materiality (i.e. prejudice). State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 380, 247
P.3d 582, 607 (2010) (citing Stricklerv. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)).
However, "the United States Constitution does not require the State to
disclose material impeachment information prior to entering a plea agreement
with the defendant."

Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 64, 105 P.3d 376, 390

(2004) (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629
(2002)).

This is because impeachment evidence "is special in relation to the

fairness of a trial not in respect to whether a plea is voluntary."

Dunlap, 141

Idaho at 64, 106 P.3d at 390 (emphasis in original) (quoting Ruiz, 536 U.S. at
629); see also United States v. Mathur. 624 F.3d 498, 507 (1st Cir. 2010) ("Ruiz
teaches that Brady does not protect against the possible prejudice that may
ensue from the loss of an opportunity to plea-bargain with complete knowledge of
all relevant facts. This makes good sense: when a defendant chooses to admit
his guilt, Brady concerns subside.").
Further, on a Brady challenge to a guilty plea, the test of prejudice is
whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for the state's failure to
produce the information, the defendant would not have entered the plea but
would have insisted upon going to trial. Roeder v. State, 144 Idaho 415, 418,
162 P.3d 794, 797 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 436,
885 P.2d 1144, 1152 (Ct. App. 1994). In making this determination, the court will
"employ an objective assessment, based in part on the persuasiveness of the

7

withheld information as to whether the particular defendant and his counsel
would have insisted on going to trial." Roeder, 144 Idaho at 418-419, 162 P.3d
at 797-798. The court will not consider a defendant's subjective statements that
he would not have pied guilty had he known of the information.

1!h

at 419, 162

P.3d at 798. The court must also consider any objective motivations a defendant
may have had for pleading guilty. Gardner, 126 Idaho at 436-437, 885 P.2d at
1152-1153.

"Any benefit derived by the defendant from the guilty plea is a

significant factor inasmuch as a plea may be heavily motivated by reduction of
exposure to additional charges and criminal penalties."

1!h

at 437, 885 P.2d at

1153
In this case, the district court correctly concluded that the state was not
required to disclose evidence of lab misconduct prior to Schultz' guilty plea,
because such evidence was merely potentially impeaching, and not exculpatory.
(R., pp.197-199.) In addition, Schultz has failed to show prejudice, in that he has

failed to show that but for the state's failure to produce the information, a
reasonable defendant in his position would have insisted on going to trial.
Schultz has therefore failed to show that the district court erred in summarily
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.

1.

Evidence Regarding Idaho State Police Lab Misconduct Was
Merely Impeaching

Impeachment evidence is that which is designed to discredit a witness, i.e.
to reduce the effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth evidence which
explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony. State v. Marsh,

8

141 Idaho 862, 868-869, 119 P.3d 637, 643-644 (Ct. App. 2004). Exculpatory
evidence relates to a defendant's guilt or innocence. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho
772, 781, 984 P.2d 127, 136 (1997). As discussed above, a state has no duty to
disclose evidence which is merely impeaching, and not exculpatory, prior to a
defendant's guilty plea. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629.
Anderson's unauthorized maintenance of a box of controlled substances
at the Idaho State Police Laboratory for display purposes did not constitute
exculpatory evidence because it did not relate to Schultz' guilt or factual
innocence. There is no indication from the record that the unauthorized conduct
involved any forensic testing, or had any effect on the accuracy and reliability of
any forensic testing actually conducted.
At most, the evidence related only to Anderson's credibility, and thus
constituted potential impeachment testimony. Schultz appeared to acknowledge
as much in his amended post-conviction petition, in which he alleged he was
"prohibited from engaging in appropriate cross-examination of Skyler Anderson
concerning the above-described violations of laboratory policies and procedures
in order to impeach him with regards to his credibility and propensity for
truthfulness, all in violation of Petitioner's Sixth Amendment Constitutional Right
to confront all [the] witnesses against him." (R., p.96; see also R., pp.148-156
(Schultz' "Amended Memorandum in Opposition to State's Motion for Summary
Dismissal," in which Schultz describes the potentially impeaching nature of the
lab misconduct evidence)).

At a hearing on the state's motion for summary

dismissal, Schultz conceded that the Idaho State Police's investigation did not

9

concern Anderson's qualifications or the quality of his testing, but instead
implicated his right to impeach Anderson. (Tr., p.22, L.13 - p.26, L.13.)
It was only after the district court summarily dismissed Schultz' petition
that Schultz then claimed, in his motion for reconsideration, that the lab
misconduct evidence was both impeaching and exculpatory. (R., pp.210-212.)
Specifically, Schultz contends that the evidence was exculpatory because
Anderson's reliability is "determinative of guilt or innocence." (Appellant's brief,
pp.16-17.)

This contention is unpersuasive. Any lack of "reliability" or credibility

that can be inferred from Anderson's unauthorized maintenance of controlled
substances for display purposes is not at all "determinative" of the accuracy, or
lack thereof, of forensic testing completed on completely separate substances.
Schultz' attack is on Anderson's credibility, not on the accuracy of the testing
conducted in this case.
In addition, Schultz appears to contend that the evidence of lab
misconduct casts doubt on the entire proper functioning of the lab and the testing
it conducts.

(Appellant's brief, p.18.)

Specifically, Schultz asserts that the

misconduct "clearly demonstrates that there were no set procedures concerning
the amount of substance which was to be taken from each substance for testing
purposes, there were no rules or regulations concerning the destruction of
samples, nor were the forensic analysts being audited concerning their policies
and procedures relating to the analysis of controlled substances," and that it is
"entirely possible that the entire forensic laboratory was contaminated by the
unaccounted for controlled substances." (Appellant's brief, p.18.)
10

There is no support in the record for these contentions. The very nature of
the misconduct was that Anderson's maintenance of the controlled substances
occurred outside the rules, regulations, and regular procedures of the state lab.
These substances maintained for display purposes were, in fact, "not tracked"
and "untraceable." Thus, the existence of these controlled substances did not
demonstrate the lack of existing procedures and regulations, but constituted a
violation of those existing regulations concerning the maintenance and tracking
of these specific drugs that were maintained improperly.

These violations

occurred entirely outside normal functions of the state lab, including its forensic
testing function, and there is no indication that they implicated results of the
testing associated with Schultz' criminal case.
As in Ruiz, Schultz' guilty plea precludes a Brady challenge based on
impeachment evidence.

Because evidence that Idaho State Police forensic

scientists maintained an unauthorized box of controlled substances for display
purposes was not exculpatory, but was merely impeaching, the state did not
have a duty to disclose it prior to Schultz' guilty plea. Schultz has therefore failed
to show that state the state committed a Brady violation, or that the district court
erred in summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition.

2.

In The Alternative, Schultz Has Failed To Show Prejudice

Even if the state had the duty to disclose the evidence of lab misconduct
prior to Schultz' guilty plea, Schultz has still failed to establish a Brady violation
because he has failed to establish prejudice. Specifically, he has failed to show

11

that but for the state's failure to produce the information, that a reasonable
defendant in his position would have insisted on going to trial.
For many of the same reasons the evidence is not exculpatory, it was also
of little value to Schultz' defense at any trial.

Schultz has identified no nexus

between Anderson's misconduct and the testing results that incriminated him in
his criminal case.

The existence of the lab misconduct did not refute the

accuracy of the results of the forensic testing that incriminated Schultz, nor did it
reduce or negate Schultz' culpability in any way. In addition, while not dispositive
to the objective analysis of prejudice, Schultz submitted no sworn statements
during the post-conviction proceedings indicating why he pied guilty to the
methamphetamine possession charge, or even whether he would have gone to
trial if the lab misconduct evidence had been available to him.
It appears from the record that Schultz received a plea bargain benefit
from entering his guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. While there is
no direct evidence in the record regarding the nature of any plea bargain, Schultz
was also charged in Case No. CR-2006-2718 with possession of drug
paraphernalia.

(See Idaho Data Repository, Minidoka County, Case No. CR

2006-02718.) That charge was dismissed shortly after Schultz was sentenced to
possession of methamphetamine in the same case. (Id.) Schultz also received
the benefit of a concurrent sentence. The district court ran Schultz' possession
of methamphetamine sentence concurrently with a sentence imposed upon a
revoked probation in another case. (R., p.122; see also Idaho Data Repository,
Minidoka County, Case No. CR 2005-01139.)
12

Even if the district court erred in concluding that the state had no duty to
disclose the lab misconduct prior to Schultz' guilty plea, Schultz has still failed to
show that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his post-conviction
petition, because he has failed to show prejudice from any lack of disclosure.

11.
Schultz Has Failed To Show That The District Court Manifestly Abused its
Discretion In Denying His Motion For Reconsideration
Fourteen days after the district court summarily dismissed his petition for
post-conviction relief, Schultz filed a Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to
l.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B).

(R., pp.205-213.)

Because l.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B) pertains

only to motions for reconsideration made from interlocutory orders of the trial
court, the district court construed the motion as a timely l.R.C.P. 59(e) motion to
alter or amend a civil judgment. (R., pp.217-224 (citing Ross v. State, 141 Idaho
670, 671, 115 P.3d 761, 762 (Ct. App. 2005)).
Pursuant to l.R.C.P. 59(e), a district court may correct legal and factual
errors occurring in the proceedings before it. Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 71,
175 P.3d 754, 760 (2007). A decision to grant or deny an l.R.C.P. 59(e) motion
for reconsideration generally rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. (Id.)
An order denying a motion made under l.R.C.P. 59(e) to alter or amend a
judgment is appealable, but only on the question of whether there has been a
manifest abuse of discretion. Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259, 263, 646 P.2d 1030,
1034 (1982).

13

In his l.R.C.P. 59(e) motion, Schultz asked the district court to reconsider
its determination that Schultz failed to establish a prima facie claim of a Brady
violation.

(R., pp.205-212.) Schultz also requested, for the first time, 3 for the

court to grant him a new trial on the basis of the "newly discovered evidence" of
the lab misconduct. (R., p.212.)
The district court considered the merits of Schultz' arguments regarding
the alleged Brady violation, but found that Schultz failed to show either that
evidence of the lab misconduct was exculpatory rather than impeaching, or that
Schultz established prejudice. (R., pp.217-221.) The court then recognized that
that it lacked the authority to consider Schultz' new evidence claim raised for the
first time in his l.R.C.P. 59(e) motion. 4 (R., pp.222-223.)
For the reasons discussed in Section I, above, Schultz has failed to show
that the district court erred in denying his motion to reconsider its rejection of his
Brady claim. On appeal, Schultz does not challenge the district court's rejection
of his request for a new trial, but in any event, the district court correctly
concluded that a defendant cannot raise new claims in an l.R.C.P. 59(e) motion.
See Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, 707, 979 P.2d 107, 109 (1999)
("As a means to circumvent an appeal, Rule 59(e) provides a trial court a

3

Schultz' initial pro se petition for post-conviction relief referenced a "new
evidence" claim. (R., p.2) However, his amended petition abandoned this claim
and instead alleged a Brady violation. (R., pp.94-98.)
4

The district court also determined that even if it had such authority, Schultz
failed to present new material evidence that would probably produce an acquittal.
(R., pp.222-223 (citing State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976)).
14

mechanism to correct legal and factual errors occurring in proceedings before
it.").

Therefore, Schultz has failed to show that the district court manifestly

abused its discretion by denying his motion for reconsideration.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
summarily dismissing Schultz' petition for post-conviction relief, and its order
denying his motion for reconsideration.
DATED this 17th day of June, 2013.

'

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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